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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the economic welfare implications of mortality 
change within a framework that both recognizes general equilibrium 
effects and incorporates full age-specific accounting. Two formal results 
are derived. Under a life-cycle welfare criterion, changes in the age- 
pattern of mortality, caused say by a medical breakthrough, should be 
assessed on the utility of additional life-years, production, and repro- 
duction, less expected additional social costs of support. Loss of life at 
a specific age should be assessed on the opportunity costs of expected 
lost years of living and lost production and reproduction, less expected 
social support costs. From these results it is seen that current methods, 
in general, leave out an important social transfer term, that the valuation 
of life-risks is highly agedependent, and that the degree of diminishing 
returns to consumption plays an important part in calculations of the 
economic cost of risks. 
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One of the more difficult questions the economist faces is how to  assess 
activities - engineering projects, safety procedures, medical advances - that 
raise o r  lower risks t o  human life. It is clear that in most situations proper 
safety should be a matter of degree: engineering constructions should 
neither be infinitely solid nor built too close t o  their limits of strength. 
But how safe is safe enough? What meaning can be given t o  phrases such 
as "the value of life" o r  "the cost of hazards to  life?" And what are the 
economic consequences of the fact that mortality risks are gradually 
falling -- that life is lengthening? 
One method for evaluating mortality risks, in widespread use by 
government agencies and engineers, is the human capital approach. It has 
been proposed in various forms,' but the basic method sums earnings 
forgone by individuals lost through death or  incapacitation, and sets 
these against the net economic benefits of the activity. (Whether these 
earnings should be net of the  individual's consumption or  not  has been 
the subject of  some contention.) Useful as this method is in giving precise 
dollar values, from a welfare theory viewpoint it is founded on thin logic. 
As Schelling argued in 1968, by concentrating purely on wage or  GNP 
loss it ignores the individual's own desire t o  live. Under human capital, 
a medical breakthrough that prolonged life from 70  t o  8 0  years, for. 
example, would have no particular social justification - it would not  
raise GNP. 
The willingness-to-pay method, proposed by Mishan (1 9 7  1 ) does 
recognize the natural desire t o  live longer. Under this method a scheme 
' See, for example, Weisbrod (1961), I.'romm (1962), and Rottenberg (1967). For surveys of the 
general literature on the evaluation of mortality risk, see Acton (1976) and Linnerooth (1978). 
that increased life from 70 to 8 0  would be socially justified if those 
who benefited were willing, in theory at least, t o  pay more for their 
extra years than the cost of the scheme. Wider social benefits, to  close 
relatives for example, would be included by assessing willingness to pay 
for the increased life of loved ones. This method, based on welfare 
utilities and not on dollar earnings, has obvious difficulties of quanti- 
fication. Recently, Conley (1976), Usher (1973), and Jones-Lee (1974) 
have proposed separate methods to put the criterion on a quantitative 
footing, by modeling the rational person's willingness to buy extra 
life-years and valuing it in consumption terms. 
The two methods, human capital and willingness to  pay, are worth 
comparing for a moment. The new willingness-to-pay literature, unlike 
the human-capital writings, is grounded solidly on welfare theory logic. 
It starts from commonly accepted assumptions and proceeds deductively 
to  its findings. On the other hand, human capital has the appealing 
property that it is actuarial: it uses full agespecific accounting to  
evaluate changes in mortality. Thus it can discriminate between lives 
lost at different ages and also between activities with equal risk but 
with different age-patterns of incidence. The new willingness-to-pay 
literature loses this property. It bases its analyses on the implications 
of a change in probability p of death at some arbitrary single future 
age or time. It would be difficult in this framework t o  evaluate a cure 
for cancer that causes a continuous pattern of changes over the entire 
mortality age schedule. 
Both methods, whether actuarial or based on welfare theory or 
not, suffer a common major deficiency. They are fundamentally partial- 
equilibrium approaches. They ignore the chain of wider economic 
transfers set up through society when life is lengthened. To return to  the 
earlier example, willingness-to-pay, as currently interpreted, would 
approve an advance in life from 70 to 80 years if those affected and 
their kin were willing to  pay the cost of the increase. Forgotten, how- 
ever, is that prolongation of life is not costless to  wider society: those 
who live longer, consume longer, and this extra consumption must be 
financed by transfers from people at younger productive ages. Proper 
accounting we would suspect should include intergenerational transfer 
costs, felt in this case as a heavier social security burden on the young. 
This paper sets out to deduce the economic welfare implications 
of mortality change from a simple set of assumptions in a framework 
that both recognizes general equilibrium effects and incorporates full 
agespecific accounting. Two formal results are derived. These show 
that, under the chosen lifecycle welfare criterion, alterations in the 
mortality schedule, caused say by a medical breakthrough, should be 
assessed on the utility of expected additional life-years, production, 
and reproduction, less expected additional social costs of support. Loss 
of life at a specific age, due to an accident say, should be assessed on the 
opportunity costs of expected lost years of living, lost production and 
reproduction, less expected social support costs. From these results 
it is seen that current methods, in general, leave out  an important social 
transfer term, that the valuation of life-risks is highly age- 
dependent, and that the degree of diminishing returns to  consumption 
plays an important part in calculations of the economic costs of risks. 
1 THE ECONOMICS O F  CHANGES IN MORTALITY RISK 
T o  set the context for the analysis, I first set up a neoclassical, age- 
specific model of the economy and population. Within this model, the 
effect of a change in the mortality pattern on lifecycle well-being is 
then derived. Both population and economy are assumed to be in 
steady-state growth, individuals t o  be alike in tastes and behavior, and 
production to  show constant returns. Later, I shall discuss whether the 
results hold up when these assumptions are relaxed. 
Neoclassical Mode1 
Begin with the economy. Output is produced by combining capital K 
with labor L in a constant-returns production function F.' The economy 
stores no  consumption goods. Output is split into consumption and 
investment in capital growth. Thus 
F(K(t ) ,  L (t)) = C(t)  + ~ ( t ) ,  C(t)  2 0. (1 
For the population we need a fair degree of age-specific detail. 
The population grows according to  the Lotka dynamics 
where B is births per unit time, p ( t ,  x )  is the proportion of those born 
a t  time t - x who survive to  age x ,  and m is the proportion reproducing 
at age x ,  time t ;  w is an upper bound on the length of life, and the initial 
birth sequence is assumed given. This year's flow of births, in other words, 
' F is assumed concave, first-degree homogeneous, and continuously differentiable; for sim- 
plicity, capital depreciation is ignored. 
is produced by those who were born x years ago and have survived t o  
reproduce. 
Assume the population is  table,^ and is growing exponentially at  
rate g. In this case equation (2) has the solution 
where the growth rate g is connected to  mortality p and fertility m by 
substituting equation (3)  in equation (2) and canceling B t o  yield 
If X(x) is the age schedule of labor participation, the labor force L 
and total population N are given by 
The labor/population ratio L/N and the birth rate BIN will be denoted by 
h (g) and b (g), respectively. 
Individual consumption varies with age, as d o  the mortality, fertility, 
and labor participation rates above. (How it varies is determined below.) 
Putting population and economic variables together, we can express total 
consumption C as the sum of individual age-related consumption c ( t , x )  by 
Later, we shall need three parameters: the average ages of producing 
A L  , consuming A,,  and reproducing A,, , in the population, defined by 
' That is, its age-specific rates of  fertility and mortality and its normalized agedistribution are all 
constant over time;g is assumed positive. 
Assuming the economy has reached a Solow-type steady state, where 
the growth rate of the economy equals that of population and per capita 
variables are constant, and assuming investment is chosen to  maximize 
total consumption, then 
K/K = g ;  c ( t ,  x )  = c(x) ;  and FK = g. (8) 
One central fact in society is that consumption, which takes place at 
all ages, must be supported by production, which takes place only at labor- 
participative ages. The economy, in other words, functions at all times 
under the budget identity 
that is, 
W W I ~ ( t  -x)p(x)c(x)dx  = (F/L - g ~ / ~ )  I B ( ~  -x)p(x)h(x)  dx. 
0 0 
Using equation (3) and dividing through by B(t) ,  with usual per-unit 
labor notation this societal budget constraint becomes 
Thus, intergenerational transfers are introduced by the inescapable require- 
ment that,  when growth, labor-participation rates, and the capital-labor 
ratio remain unchanged, any increase in consumption for one age group 
must be matched by decreases for other age groups. 
To complete the model, it remains to  determine the life-cycle pattern 
of consumption. Let U[c,  x ]  be the utility rate of being alive at age x ,  
given consumption rate c. It is assumed that people individually allocate 
their consunlption to  maximize their expected lifetime welfare W, where 
In aggregate, of course, they must d o  this in such a way that the societal 
budget constraint continues to hold at  all times. Standard consumption- 
loan mechanisms (Samuelson 1958) ensure that this happens: a market 
interest rate and social insurance arrangements appear that encourage 
people to distribute their consumption over their life cycle t o  maximize 
W in such a way that the societal budget constraint is always met. The 
exact mechanisms of this need not concern us; it is sufficient to say that 
the individual spreads his consumption so that life-cycle welfare is maxi- 
mized subject to (10) being met. Finding the life-cycle consumption 
pattern is thus a simple constrained variational problem, the solution of 
which yields 
au lac  (x) = au/ac(o)e-gx. (1 2) 
Thus life-cycle consumption is patterned according to  age-related need, 
so that its marginal usefulness is the same at all ages, modified only by 
the ability to invest at an interest rate g, which equals the rate of popu- 
lation growth. Condition (12) therefore is the continuous-age general- 
ization of Samuelson's "biological interest rate" condition. 
All preliminaries are now completed. Population and economic 
growth are well-defined [equations (3),  (4), and (8)1, as is the pattern 
of life-cycle consumption (1 2). And the societal budget identity (1 0) 
connects the demography of consumption with that of production. 
Change in Age-Specific Risks 
We now introduce a particular, but small age-specific change in age-specific 
risks, so that the mortality schedule p(x)  becomes p (x) + 6p(x), and 
derive the implications of our chosen criterion - the representative 
person's expected lifetime welfare, W.4 
1 Survival 
FIGURE 1 Change in age-specific mortality risks. 
' A word on  the choice of expected lifetime utility as the social criterion. It is quite legitimate to 
ask what the consequences are of risk-change for any arbitrary criterion. Suitability of a 
particular criterion depends on  how well it "represents" social interestsand on  the "reasonableness" 
of the implications, both judgmental matters. Assuming risk-neutral individuals with identical 
tastes who fulfill the von Neurnann-Morgenstern choice axioms, W is arguably representative. 
Reasonableness of implications will be judged later. 
Figure 1 illustrates the shape of the function 6p - the variation in 
the mortality curve - for a decrease in the incidence of cancer (scale of  
6p exaggerated slightly). For convenience, I shall assume in this section 
that the mortality variation lengthens life; for shortened life, the argument 
is symmetrical. 
When the mortality schedule changes, several variables are forced t o  
change with it: the growth rate g,  the consumption pattern c(x) ,  life-cycle 
welfare W, and others. I shall write 6g [6pl  as the differential change5 in 
growth due t o  the particular age-specific mortality variation 6p. Where the 
variation 6p is understood, I shall simply write 6g. Similar practice will be 
followed with other variables. 
At this point some new notation will be useful. Let 
Vex = j e-gXm(x)6p(x)dx 
0 
The first three can be viewed as the expectations of extra utility from 
lengthened life, of extra lifetime consumption, and of extra man-years of 
production resulting from the particular variation 6p. The fourth, vex,  
is in demographic terms the change in reproductive value at  birth - loosely 
speaking, it is the expected additional children per person due to  the 
mortality variation. (The last three are discounted because future con- 
sumption utilities are later valued t o  date of birth.) 
T o  derive 6g [6p ]  , the change in the intrinsic growth rate due to  the 
mortality variation, recall equation (4): 
Using the appropriate chain rule 
Technically, bg[bp(x)l is a 1:richet differential - a differential whose argument is a function 
and not a single-valued variable. 
W W 
0 = e-gxrn(x)6p(x)dx - 6 g j  xe-gxm(x)p(x)dx,  
0 0 
whence w 
le-gx m (x)bp(x)dx 
] xc-gx m (x)p (x) dx 
0 
The altered mortality pattern affects the growth rate by the change in 
reproductive value at  birth divided by the average age of motherhood 
(average length between generations). Note that if the mortality variation 
affects only postreproductive ages, vex is zero, so that no  change in the 
growth rate occurs. 
We can now derive the change in expected lifetime welfare, 6 W [6p  1 . 
From equation (1 1 ) 
Life-cycle welfare is changed directly by extra years and indirectly by the 
alteration in the consumption pattern needed t o  accommodate these extra 
years. The latter can be evaluated by taking differentials across the 
societal budget identity (1  0). This yields, on collecting terms, 
W W 
- ( f ( k )  - -gk){  e-" h(x)6p(x)dx - 6 k (  f ~ - - ~ ) j e - ~ ~  h(x)p(x)dx  -06g 
0 0 
where ( 1  6 )  
From the savings rule f" = g ,  the fourth term in equation (1 6 )  disappears. 
Where F is per capita consumption, 0, the life-cycle value of a marginal 
increase in the growth rate, can be expressed as 
Finally, using equation (16) to substitute for the second term in 
equation (1 5 ) ,  and noting that for constant returns f - kg is FL , we obtain 
Reexpressed in more convenient notation, this becomes our first main 
result. The net life-cycle utility value of a particular age-specific change in 
mortality risk is given by 
Life-cycle Utility of Value of Social cost of Value of 
welfare = extra life- + extra labor- - consumption + additional 
increase years years upkeep children ( 1 8) 
The net increase in individual life-cycle welfare thus consists of four 
components. When mortality is improved, the individual is blessed with 
extra years of life, extra years of productive work if preretirement years 
are affected, and extra children if reproductive years are affected. On the 
other hand, extra years must somehow be supported. The third term 
shows the total amount of consumption support needed - a  burden on 
social security, or a burden on private savings earlier in life, or a burden 
on one's children, depending on the particular social insurance arrange- 
ment that ensures support for the elderly. 
These welfare changes occur at different periods in the life cycle. 
Those in the younger productive age-groups carry the consumption cost; 
only in later life do they reap the utility of extra years, the costs now 
turned over to a new generation. To the extent that population is 
growing, younger age-groups are larger than older ones and transfers 
toward later ages are easier on the individual; this is why the analysis 
discounts costs at rate g over the life cycle in the above terms. 
2 VALUE OF LIFE 
Until now I have viewed activities that put life under hazard in rather 
inconvenient terms as causing variations in the mortality age-profile. Is 
it possible to proceed more directly and value actual lives lost or saved? In 
the literature, most writers prefer to  deal with marginal changes in risk rather 
than with direct loss of life, feeling possibly that increase of risk is more 
approachable somehow, less awesome, than loss of life. From an actuarial 
viewpoint, however, risk and death cannot be separated. For any sizable 
population, an increase in age-specific risk means, in life-table terms, an 
increase in numbers of deaths at specific ages. We might therefore expect 
valuation of risk and valuation of lives lost to be closely connected. 
Let us approach the valuation of lives lost by asking a specific 
question. Suppose in the community an unspecified activity were to 
take one life at  random at age a ,  how much welfare would the community 
as a whole be prepared to give up to rid itself of the increased risk? The 
result will be called the Social Welfare Equivalent (SWE) of life at age a.  
To answer this question, go back to  the life table - to how p(x)  
is constructed. A life-table is calculated by taking a base number of 
births, B, (for example 10,000) and observing the year-by-year decrements 
in survivorship. Assume now that every B people born undergo one 
additional death at age a .  Until age a there is no  difference in survivorship; 
at  age a there are Bp (a) - 1 survivors instead of Bp (a); at age x > a there 
are (Bp (a) - 1 )(p (x)/p (a)) survivors instead of Bp (x). The additional 
death therefore causes a variation in the mortality schedule (see Figure 2) 
equal to the difference in numbers surviving divided by the base: 
I shall write p (x)/p (a) as p,(x), the probability of survival to age x given 
survival already to age a. 
Survival 
0 ,  
a x Age 
FIGURE 2 Mortality variation caused by an additional single death at age a. 
We have now translated the value-of-life problem into one of valuing 
changes or variations in the mortality schedule; hence we can use the 
machinery of the previous section. Substituting the variation (19) into 
equation (1 8), the additional death imposes a risk that lowers the expected 
life-cycle welfare of each representative individual by an amount 
This expression tells us how much additional life-cycle welfare would 
compensate the representative person for taking on this small additional 
risk. It would therefore take B times this amount to  compensate the total 
number of persons at risk, B. Hence we multiply equation (20) by B to  
arrive at the social welfare equivalent, S W E ,  that would compensate for 
the increased risk corresponding to loss of one life at  age a .  This yields 
our second main result - a result that has an obvious actuarial interpretation 
s w E  = j U [ c ( x ) l p a ( x ) b  + 
a 
Welfare Value of remaining 
equivalent of = years of life at age a + 
loss of life at 
age a 
Value of remaining Cost of Value of remaining 
labor years at age a - remaining + reproduction at 
consumption age a 
upkeep at age a (2 1) 
Where the utility and consumption rates are roughly constant at U(a) and 
cia) over the remaining years; where w(= FL ) is the wage rate; where ex 
is the expected value of remaining survival years at age x ;  and where 
- - -  
ex,  elx, emx are the discounted expected values of remaining survival- 
years, labor-years, and net fertility at age x ,  we can write equation (21) 
in the useful form 
The result tells us that a marginal life lost is valued in terms of oppor- 
tunity lost - opportunity to  enjoy further life, to produce further output, 
to  have additional children, less, of course, consumption support costs no 
longer necessary. 
Thus far we have assessed the value of a single life lost at a particular 
age. The analysis can be extended fairly simply to  the case of numbers of 
lives lost at various ages. Consider an activity R (air travel say) that costs 
Deg' lives in yeat t ,  where the nupbers of deaths are small relative to  total 
deaths and are growing at the same rate as the population. Assume these 
deaths are distributed as d(a)egt at age a ,  so that the probability that a 
life lost to  this activity is aged a is r#IR (a) = d (a)/D. In our analysis the cost 
of lives lost is imputed to  this year's cohort, which stands to  lose d (a)eg(' 
lives at age a in year t + a.  The value-of-life argument above is additive 
over lives lost; therefore for this activity in year t ,  total (welfareequivalent) 
losses are 
Total SWE = x d (a)eg'ega S W E ( ~ ) .  
a 
Finally, multiplying above and below by D gives the needed result 
Total SWE = Deg' 1 r#IR (a)ega SWE(a). (23) 
a 
Cost of lives lost, in other words, is the number of deaths per year times 
the expected cost of a death in the activity in q ~ e s t i o n . ~  
3 DISCUSSION AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
Any riskevaluation method must unavoidably compare two very different 
things: the enjoyment of additional living [U,, in equation ( l8 ) l  and the 
enjoyment of additional consumption [the terms within the braces in 
equation (1 8)] . We can simplify further discussion greatly by expressing 
all terms in consistent units. To do  this we apply the results to  the special 
case where the form of the utility function U does not vary with age, 
and U has constant elasticity of consumption E ,  given in the usual way by 
In this special case, with some further algebra it can be shown that 
equation (1 8) reduces to 
The ega factor enters to preserve consistency: the cost-of-loss-of-life argument was developed on  
a cohort (life-cycle) basis, whereas deaths are introduced on  a period (current-year) basis. 
where w (= FL ) is the wage rate. Utility of additional years now reduces to 
c ~ , / E  when translated into consumption terms. Finally, dropping the 
aU/ac(O) factor, we may express the value of the mortality change to 
the individual directly as marginal consumption equivalent (CE) to  
This equation shows that a crucial, but arbitrary, element in the 
evaluation of mortality change is the degree of diminishing returns to  
consumption -- the degree to  which pure enjoyment of additional years is 
offset by its consumption cost. In our well-off society we could expect 
additions to longevity to outweigh consumption considerations (E is low), 
but in poorer societies (E is high) utility of additional living might be 
offset by the additional burden of support; in certain nomadic tribes, for 
example, older members, if no longer productive, are expected to  separate 
themselves from the tribe and die.' 
One often hears two different ethical arguments where activities 
that put life at risk are under discussion: "life is infinitely valuable" 
versus "social product is what counts." In our schema these follow from 
different positions on returns to consumption. When E tends to zero, 
equation (25) shows that additional life-years outweigh any consumption 
considerations: activities should be judged only on whether they preserve 
and prolong life. When E is one, "utility is consumption," and extensions 
to life are perfectly offset by their consumption cost: only social product 
considerations remain. Normally, where returns to consumption are in the 
usual range, E between zero and one, equation (25) retains elements of 
both ethical positions. 
We can use equation (25) to comment on the two methods in present 
use. Willingness-to-pay, as usually interpreted, ignores the negative social 
burden term. In the usual case where the reproductive term is negligible, 
it will therefore overstate the value of mortality reduction and unduly 
bias against risky projects. Human capital tends to understate this value 
and therefore to bias toward risky projects. Only in the special case where 
(a) altered risks do not affect childbearing ages, (b) population growth is 
vanishingly small, and (c) utility shows constant returns to consumption 
(E = 11, would the (gross) human capital method be justifiable and 
correct. In this case additional life-years would be exactly offset by their 
' Even in Western society, life could not be extended much beyond 100 years unless retirement 
age were also increased. See Boulding (1965) for an entertaining essay on the economic menace of  
extreme longevity. 
consumption cost, so that equation (25) would reduce to the human 
capital measure: CE = w L e X .  (26) 
An Example: Cardiovascular Diseases 
To illustrate equation (25), let us assess the worth to the individual of 
elimination of cardiovascular diseases in the United States. Using the 
causedeleted life tables of Preston et al. (1972), Table A1 in the Appendix 
shows the agespecific mortality variation that would result. Under 1975 
U.S. data (again see the Appendix) and the definitions in (13), complete 
elimination of cardiovascular diseases yields the differentials 
Extra years cex ($ ) Lex (years) Vex  
7.69 42,670 0.692 0.00135 
Cardiovascular diseases attack for the most part postproductive and post- 
reproductive age-groups. Hence, though longevity increases significantly, 
expected working-life and expected number of children increase only a 
little. 
Where E = 1 .O, 0.6, and 0.4, from equation (25) we obtain 
I $  9,400 
= \;;;:::: 
This of course does not imply the United States should spend corre- 
sponding amounts per person on the elimination of cardiovascular diseases. 
A flood of research dollars would by no means guarantee such a break- 
through. The illustration, however, gives an idea of the potential returns 
to  the individual. 
Value o f  Life 
Having expressed the value of mortality change in consumption terms, 
we can do the same with the cost of a life lost for the special constant- 
elasticity case treated above. Expression (2 1 ) may then be reexpressed as a 
social consumption equivalent (SCE) of a life at age a :  
TABLE 1 Expected additional life-years, labor-years, and reproduction, 
and illustrative cost of loss of life at  age a.' 
Age a 
- 
ea 
- 
70.3 62.5 52.9 43.5 34.3 25.6 18.0 11.7 6.7 
e~a  
- 
31.6 32.5 31.4 24.7 17.6 10.8 4.4 0.3 - 
emu 0.921 0.949 0.882 0.339 0.038 - - - - 
~ = 1 . 0  371 382 371 316 239 148 61 4 - 
SCE [ E =0.6 668 664 619 520 399 265 139 54 31 
($1000) E = 0.4 1,055 1,031 942 783 605 417 241 119 72 
a Based on U.S. 1975 data (see Appendix). Values in 1975 U.S. dollars. 
which can be written, when consumption is at constant level c(a) over the 
remaining years, as 
Table 1 gives an idea of the magnitude of the SCE at different ages and 
different returns to  consumption. We can see from this illustration8 that 
the cost of a life lost, under the chosen criterion of expected lifetime 
well-being, is highly age-dependent. Saving a life that otherwise might be 
lost in a maternity ward might therefore be quite different from saving 
a life that might otherwise be lost to cancer. 
This last point can be illustrated by comparing the social gain from 
saving (restoring to  normal survival probabilities) a life chosen randomly, 
otherwise lost to  motor-vehicle-accident death, maternal death, or cancer 
death. Table 2 gives probability distributions over age, $(a), for deaths 
due to  these causes. The expected gain in saving one life at  random in 
A couple of caveats are necessary here. These figures do not include any cost to kin of the loss 
of life of their loved one. Secondly, SCE at age 0 would not be a suitable way to measure the 
desirability of introducing an additional birth: the analysis calculates how much those already 
born would give up to avoid certain types of risk. 
TABLE 2 Age patterns of incidence for three causes of death.' 
Cause of Age 
death 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
Motor vehicle 0.027 0.045 0.224 0.152 0.1 19 0.1 17 0.1 19 0.1 16 0.081 
Maternal - - 0.25 0.452 0.299 - - - - 
Neoplasms 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.014 0.041 0.116 0.229 0.319 0.267 
From Preston et al. (1972), data for United States 1964. 
TABLE 3 Comparison of preventing death from three alternative causes. 
Expected additional SCE $1,000 (1975) 
Cause of Survival Labor Net 
death years years reproduction E = 1.0 E = 0.6 E = 0.4 
Motor vehicle 34.3 17.0 0.32 2 12 369 574 
Maternal 43.1 24.3 0.39 307 5 09 770 
Neoplasms 15.5 3.9 0.02 52 121 22 1 
year 0 is obtained from equation (23) as 
SCE = 2 q5R (a)egaSCE(a). (29) 
a 
From this expression, and the above tables, we obtain the results shown 
in Table 3 .  It should be noted that the effort or cost required to  prevent 
loss of life may be quite different for each of these causes and is not 
considered here. 
Extensions to the Analysis 
Various other factors could have been included in the analysis of sections 
1 and 2 if we cared to complicate the model. Two are mentioned here. 
First, when life of loved ones is valued, person i's utility rate U' might 
include the extra enjoyment a; that loved ones j (with age differences 
ai) are alive: 
ui* = U' + 2 a jp (x  + ai), 
i 
whence life-cycle welfare becomes for person i 
W W 
W' = 1 uip(x)dx + Z  a j p ( x  +a,)p(x)dx. 
o i 0 
Under this criterion the social value expression (18) would contain an 
extra kith-and-kin term: 
Lessened mortality risk, in other words, is twice valuable - for any 
person it increases both the chance that his parents and grandparents 
will survive to be enjoyed and the chance he will survive to  enjoy his 
children and grandchildren. The value-of-life expression, (2 1 ), would be 
modified in a similar fashion. 
Second, a change in length of life may induce a change in the age of 
retirement or in the age-specific labor participation schedule. For this 
case, analysis shows that the expected working-years terms in equations 
(18) and (21) should be expanded to  reflect extra labor years due to 
increased participation, as well as increased survival. 
Robustness 
How robust are the results of sections 1 and 2 when the assumptions of 
the model are replaced by more realistic ones? Recall that we assumed 
economic and demographic steady-state growth, constant returns in 
production, perfect lifecycle financial markets, and similar individuals 
who face similar mortality schedules. 
Note first that the most important factors are scarcely changed 
under increased realism. When risks to life fall for the population or a 
life is saved, (a) the individual does enjoy extra years, extra working 
life, and perhaps extra reproduction, and (b) whatever the support mecha- 
nism for old age, be it gifts to  tribal elders, Robinson Crusoe stockpiling, 
or a government social-security system, consumption must still be set 
aside for lengthened life (although the amount may now depend on the 
transfer mechanism). With nonconstant returns in production and 
imperfect life-cycle markets, the valuation of these factors would change, 
however. The marginal value of consumption may well vary more widely 
than in equation (12), labor would not necessarily be paid its marginal 
product, and the value of growth, 0, would be altered. With nonoptimal 
investment, an extra capital-labor ratio adjustment term would enter. 
These changes are relatively minor. More important is the case where 
altered mortality risks strike the population unevenly, or the mortality 
change comes suddenly, or demographic and economic growth vary 
widely from steady-state. In this case, some people may reap the benefits 
of increased life and production, while others bear the consumption 
costs. For example, a sudden mortality improvement can be a windfall 
to  the elderly - they enjoy extra years while escaping the corresponding 
extra support of the generation that went before. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This paper derived expressions for the value of activities that alter the 
mortality schedule and for the cost of premature loss of life, under 
specific assumptions and a lifecycle welfare criterion. A change in the 
pattern of the mortality schedule, it was shown, should be assessed by 
the difference it makes to expected length of life,production, reproduction, 
and consumption support; loss of life should be assessed by the expected 
opportunity costs of lost years, production, and reproduction, less 
support costs. 
Full age-specific accounting, where labor participation, consumption, 
fertility, mortality, and utility depend on age, brings an actuarial precision 
to  the results: the separate implications of mortality change - for length 
of life, production, consumption, and reproduction - can be assessed 
quite accurately. It also shows that it is meaningless to  talk about a single 
value of life: the age of the life (or a probability distribution for it) 
must be specified. Valuation of life in fact depends heavily on age, as the 
illustrations above show; this follows directly from our choice of a life- 
cycle criterion. A life lost at age 8 0  has less opportunity to  contribute 
to  this criterion than one lost at age 30, hence the implied value of life 
decreases with age. This sits comfortably, for the most part, with our 
intuitive feelings; if we felt, on the other hand, that "a life is a life what- 
ever the age" a life-cycle criterion would be no longer appropriate. 
The simple, generalequilibrium framework adopted in this analysis 
shows that social-support costs figure large in the valuation of risks to 
life. The degree to  which these offset the pure enjoyment of staying 
alive makes a significant difference to  numerical assessments. Where 
being alive is valued much more highly than pure consumption, additional 
support costs, like additional wage earning, fade from significance. But 
where the value of being alive is measured purely by additional consump- 
tion - where utility shows constant returns to consumption - the gain 
from added longevity is canceled completely by the additional consump- 
tion support required. 
APPENDIX 
The illustrations use U.S. data chosen to  correspond to year 1975. All 
data and illustrations are for male and female combined. (In the maternal 
TABLE A1 Age-specific survival schedules and variation caused by elimination of cardiovascular diseases! 
Survival Age 
probability 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
a From latest available cause-ofdeath life tables: Preston et 01. (1972), for United States 1964. 
TABLE A2 Labor participation schedule? 
a Source of data: 1 L o  Year Book 1976; data for United States 1975. 
TABLE A3 Fertility schedule! 
Age 
a Source of data: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1977; data for 1974. 
death illustration, excepting the age-incidence distribution, to preserve 
consistency the same combined malelfemale data were used as in the 
other illustrations.) 
The tables above give the survival, labor participation, and fertility 
schedules used in the illustrations. In Table A1 p (x)  is the usual survival 
table, used throughout the illustrations; pE (x) would obtain if cardio- 
vascular diseases were eliminated; 6p(x), the variation caused by elimi- 
nating these diseases, is the difference. The 1964 survival probabilities 
are used throughout the illustrations; mortality in the U.S. has changed 
but little in the last 15 years. For conciseness, only 10-year intervals are 
shown above; most calculations, however, were based on 5-year intervals. 
Preston (1976) contains further details on cause of death. 
Other data9 used in the illustrations are 
L = 94,793,000, N = 2 13,137,000, Z = $6,142, K = $4,303 billion. 
In the absence of a usable consumption ageschedule, it is assumed 
that those 15 and under consume one-half of an adult's standard consump- 
tion; those 65 and above, three-quarters. This yields, for consistency 
with average consumption 7,  
Computations on the above data, smoothed where necessary, yield1' 
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